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Abstract
Many countries simultaneously suffer from high rates of inflation, low growth
rates of per capita income and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we
integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous
growth to examine the effects of inflation and financial development. A novel feature
of the model is that the market for innovation goods is decentralized. Financial
intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquid funds to the innovation sector.
We calibrate the model to address two quantitative issues. One is the effects of an
exogenous improvement in the productivity of the financial sector on welfare and per
capita growth. The other is the effects of inflation on welfare and growth. Consistent
with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large
gains in the growth rate of per capita income as well as in welfare. Relative to
reducing inflation, improving the efficiency of the financial market increases growth
and welfare by much smaller amounts.
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1 Introduction
Many countries simultaneously suffer from high rates of inflation, low growth rates of per
capita income and poorly developed financial sectors. For example, during the period from
1960 to 1995, Bolivia had an average annual inflation rate of 50%, a low growth rate of
per capita income of 0.36%, and a share of the financial sector in GDP that was about 5
times smaller than the share in the US. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model
of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation
and financial development. We calibrate the model to address two quantitative issues. One
is how inflation quantitatively affects welfare and the growth rate of per capita income.
The other is how an exogenous improvement in the productivity of the financial sector
quantitatively affects welfare and growth.
The empirical literature has documented that financial development has a robust and
positive effect on economic growth and that inflation has robust and negative effects on
financial development and growth (e.g., Levine et al, 2000, Boyd et al, 2001, and King
and Levine, 1993a,b). These effects are sizable, even after controlling for country-specific
factors such as the level of a country’s development, political factors, trade and price
distortions, and fiscal policy. For example, the regression coefficients in Levine et al (2000)
suggest that an exogenous improvement in financial intermediation from the level in India
to the sample average in the period 1960-1995 (i.e., an increase of 28%) can increase annual
growth rate of per capita income by 0.6 percentage points. The regression coefficients in
Boyd et al (2001) suggest that an increase in inflation by the median value in the sample
(9%) can reduce financial intermediation by 26% in low-inflation countries.
Table 1 (Data): Inflation, growth and financial development
annual
inflation (%)
net growth rate of
real pc income (%)
bank
credita
liquid
liabilitiesb
net interest
marginc
Low 5.58 3.00 0.48 0.65 0.030
Mid 9.26 1.88 0.28 0.43 0.035
High 30.58 1.40 0.18 0.29 0.059
aDefined as claims on private sector by deposit money banks, as share of GDP. bDefined as currency plus
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, as share of GDP.
cDefined as interest income earned minus interest income paid divided by total assets
Table 1 displays the relationship between inflation, real per capita growth, and three
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commonly used measures of financial development or the financial sector size.1 One mea-
sure is bank credit, defined as claims on the private sector by deposit money banks as the
share of GDP. The second measure is liquid liabilities, defined as currency plus demand and
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, as the share of
GDP. The third measure is the net interest margin, defined as the ratio of interest income
earned minus interest income paid by total assets. While a high level of bank credit or
liquid liabilities indicates high development and efficiency of the financial sector, a high net
interest margin indicates low development and efficiency.2 Table 1 shows that countries
with higher growth in real GDP per capita tend to have both larger financial sectors and
lower rates of inflation. This evidence suggests that one needs to examine the effects of
financial sector size, the efficiency of financial intermediaries and inflation on economic
growth.
Although these empirical findings are suggestive, it is not clear how to interpret them.
One possible interpretation is that the statistical relationships are causal. That is, low in-
flation rates foster financial market development, financial market development promotes
economic growth and, hence, low rates of inflation promote economic growth (Altig, 2003).
If so, then the empirical findings suggest that monetary policy can help financial market
development, which in turn can increase economic growth. The competing interpretation
is that the statistical relationships may not indicate any causality, because financial devel-
opment is endogenous; in particular, a poorly developed financial sector may be a result
of a weak real economy.3
In contrast to such ambiguity, a general equilibrium model makes the causality explicit.
For this reason, it is useful to employ a general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of
inflation and financial market development on economic growth. Moreover, the empirical
literature cannot evaluate the welfare consequences of inflation and financial development.
1To construct Table 1, we have used the same cross-country data as Levine et al (2000). The data
range is 1960-1995. We sorted 63 countries for which all data was available into inflation tertiles (see the
Appendix for the countries and their allocation into the three inflation baskets). For each country type,
we then calculated the average inflation rate, the average real per capita growth rate, the average of bank
credit, the average of liquid liabilities and the average of net interest rate margin.
2Bank credit and liquid liabilities have been used in many empirical studies as indicators of financial
development (e.g., Levine et al, 2000). Interest rate spreads are used as proxies for the theoretical concept
of the cost of financial intermediation, and the most common empirical measure of bank spreads is the net
interest margin (e.g., Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000).
3See Levine (2004) for a discussion on this classic debate on whether financial development is a cause
or simply a consequence of economic development.
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How large is the welfare cost of inflation? Does the cost depend on the degree of finan-
cial development? These questions are important for designing policies, and they can be
explicitly addressed with a general equilibrium model, as we do in this paper.
We construct a model of endogenous growth with microfoundations for money and fi-
nancial intermediation. A search model with large households, as developed by Shi (1997),
is used to give fiat money an essential role in the equilibrium. The model is extended to
allow for financial intermediation and a balanced growth path. A representative household
in the model consists of a continuum of members who are allocated to four activities: pro-
ducing final consumption goods, innovating, working in the financial sector, and enjoying
leisure. The innovation sector uses labor to produce innovation goods that are the input
in the production of “knowledge capital”, which in turn increases labor productivity in
the final goods sector. As in a standard model of endogenous growth, non-diminishing
marginal productivity of knowledge capital is the source of long-run growth.
Money and financial intermediation are both essential in the innovation sector. As
a key departure from the literature, we model the market for innovation goods as a de-
centralized market where innovators are matched randomly and bilaterally. There is no
double coincidence of wants between any two innovators and no record-keeping of innova-
tors’ transactions, and so immediate settlement is needed for exchanging innovation goods
in this market. Moreover, in any given period, trading shocks generate heterogeneous de-
mand for liquidity among the innovators. Financial intermediaries emerge endogenously to
reallocate liquid funds among innovators. As in Berentsen et al (2007), these intermediaries
behave like banks since they take deposits and make loans. To simplify the analysis and
to focus on the main mechanism of the paper, we assume that the market for final goods
is centralized and perfectly competitive so that there is no need for a medium of exchange
for trading those goods.4
We use the model to quantify the effects of inflation and financial development on
growth and welfare. The model is consistent with the above mentioned stylized facts. First,
an exogenous increase in the efficiency of financial intermediaries increases the financial
sector size, the growth rate of per capita income, and welfare. Second, the financial sector
size depends on inflation negatively. Third, growth in real GDP depends on inflation
4As a robustness check we depart from this assumption in Section 5.1 by introducing a need for a
medium of exchange in the real goods sector as well and show that this reinforces our results.
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negatively. To quantify the welfare and growth effects of inflation and financial market
development, we calibrate our model to the average low-inflation country (see Table 1)
and perform several counterfactual experiments. For each of the three country types in
Table 1, we ask how much the representative household would pay in terms of consumption
for reducing inflation from the observed level to zero. Also, we calculate the welfare and
growth effects of a financial reform that increases financial productivity by 100%. Table 2
reports our main simulation results:
(i) Inflation has a large and negative effect on the growth rate of per capita income. The
average low-inflation country could increase its per capita growth rate by 0.295 percentage
points by following a zero percent inflation rate, which is several times larger than the
growth effect in the literature (see the discussion below). For the average high-inflation
country, the growth gains from eliminating inflation are much larger. Such a country could
increase its per capita growth rate by almost one percentage point by following a zero
inflation policy.
(ii) Financial market reform has much smaller growth effects than zero inflation for
all country types. Increasing financial productivity by 100% (see the definition in the
text) could increase per capita growth rate by 0.032 percentage points for the average low-
inflation country and by 0.025 percentage points for the average high-inflation country.
Both numbers are one order of magnitude smaller than the growth gains from reducing
inflation to zero.
(iii) Reducing inflation to zero or doubling financial productivity both have sizable
welfare gains. For eliminating inflation, an average low-inflation country is willing to give
up 1.42% of consumption and an average high-inflation country is willing to give up 5.32%
of consumption. For doubling financial productivity, an average low-inflation country is
willing to give up 0.33% of consumption and an average high-inflation country is willing
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to give up 0.29% of consumption.
Table 2 (Results): Price stability vs. financial market reform
current annual inflation rate
Low (5.6%) Middle (9.3%) High (30.6%)
welfare
gaina
growth
gainb
welfare
gaina
growth
gainb
welfare
gaina
growth
gainb
zero inflation 1.421 0.295 2.212 0.448 5.316 0.998
financial reform 0.332 0.032 0.324 0.030 0.285 0.025
aDefined as the percentage increase in consumption permanently.
bComputed as the increase (in percentage points) in the net growth rate of income per capita.
These results suggest that inflation is an important cause of low growth in high-inflation
countries. They support the theory that low inflation rates foster financial market devel-
opment, financial market development promotes economic growth, and hence low rates of
inflation promote economic growth (Altig, 2003). Moreover, financial market reform does
not boost growth significantly, but it does increase welfare substantially.
1.1 Relationship to the Literature
There are numerous theoretical and empirical contributions that have investigated the rela-
tionship between finance and growth. A comprehensive survey is Levine (2004).5 We focus
on the role of financial intermediaries in providing liquidity to the innovation sector, which
is intuitively important for growth. By integrating a financial sector into an environment
that generates an essential role of money, we are able to study the effects of inflation on
financial intermediation and growth.
Table 3: Welfare and growth gains of reducing inflation from 10% to 0%
traditionala Gommeb Dotsey & Irelandc our model
Growth gain (% pts) - 0.056 0.05 0.475
Welfare gain (% of c) 0.3 - 0.45 0.024 0.915 2.359
aThe traditional approach (e.g., Bailey, 1956, and Friedman, 1969) estimates the welfare cost by computing the
area under the money demand curve. bGomme (1993) considers a 10% money growth rate (8.5% inflation rate).
cThe welfare cost is 0.92% of output per year if the model is calibrated to M0 and 1.7% if it is calibrated to M1.
5Early empirical studies on the relationship between finance and growth are Goldsmith (1969), Shaw
(1973) and McKinnon (1973). More recent theoretical and empirical contributions are Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1991), King and Levine (1993a,b), Bencivenga and Smith (1993), Jones and
Manuelli (1995), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Acemoglu et al (2006), Aghion et al (2005). It is not
useful here to discuss the huge number of empirical papers on this subject. For a literature review, we
refer the reader to Levine (2004) or Boyd and Champ (2003).
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There is also a large literature that studies the effects of inflation on welfare and/or
growth.6 Traditional papers in this direction abstract from long-run growth; e.g., Fisher
(1981) and Lucas (1981).7 More recent models typically combine a variant of an endogenous
growth model with the assumption of a cash-in-advance constraint or a shopping technology
that requires money. The models are then used to quantify the cost of inflation and/or
the effect of inflation on growth. Examples are Gomme (1993), Ireland (1994), Dotsey
and Ireland (1996), and Chari et al (1996).8 The common approach in this literature is to
model financial intermediation as a provider of consumption loans.9 The common result is
that inflation has a negligible effect on the growth rate of per capita income (e.g., Gomme,
1993; Dotsey and Ireland, 1996; and Chari et al, 1996). Thus, this literature concludes
that inflation is not quantitatively important for growth, although it may affect welfare
significantly (e.g., Dotsey and Ireland, 1996).
In contrast to this literature, our model assumes that money is needed to finance the
production of innovation goods rather than consumption. This modeling assumption not
only is realistic but also gives a channel through which liquidity directly affects productivity
and growth in the economy.10 As a result, inflation has a large and negative growth effect,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Table 3 contrasts the growth and welfare
6Recent surveys on the cost of inflation are Craig and Rocheteau (2005) and Gillman and Kejak (2005a).
Craig and Rocheteau focus on stationary models while Gillman and Kejak focus on balanced growth path.
Gylfason and Herbertsson (2001) and Chari et al (1996) compare various empirical studies. After reviewing
the empirical evidence, Chari et al (1996) suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the average inflation
rate is associated with a decrease in the average growth rate between 0.2 and 0.7 percentage points. The
robustness of this relationship is questioned though. In particular, Bruno and Easterly (1998) point out
that a positive correlation between inflation and real growth depends on the inclusion of high inflation
countries. To address this valid criticism we perform a robustness check by eliminating all countries that
expericenced a hyperinflation and recalibrate the model in Section 5.2. We find that eliminating these
countries does not affect our results, rather it reinforces them as discussed there.
7Fisher (1981) and Lucas (1981) estimate the cost of inflation by calculating the appropriate welfare
cost under the money demand curve. Fisher (1981) estimates the cost of increasing the rate of inflation
from 0% to 10% to be 0.3% and Lucas (1981) to be 0.45%. For a discussion of these estimation procedures
and more recent estimates see Lucas (2000) or Craig and Rocheteau (2005).
8In a recent paper Gillman and Kejak (2005a) compare several models of endogenous growth and their
ability to produce reasonable growth effects. They find that for some endogenous growth models, there
exists parameterization that produces realistic growth effects of inflation.
9In a recent paper, Gillmann and Kejak (2009) introduce a cash-in-advance constraint for investment
goods along the lines of Stockman (1981) into an endogenous growth model. They also find large and
nonlinear growth effects of inflation.
10Silviera and Wright (2006 and 2008) emphasize the importance of liquidity for the production of
innovation goods. In particuloar, they analyze the implications of monetary policy for the venture cycle
in a search theoretic environment.
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gains from reducing inflation to zero in our model with the effects in the literature. First,
reducing the inflation rate from 10% to 0% increases the net rate of growth in per capita
income by 0.475 percentage points in our model, which is substantially larger than the
growth effect in the literature (e.g., Dotsey and Ireland, 1996). Second, reducing inflation
has a larger welfare gain in our model than in the literature. These contrasts between
our results and those in the literature suggest that the key to understanding the effects
of inflation and financial intermediation on growth is the role of liquidity and financial
intermediation in the innovation sector rather than the final goods sector.
2 The model
A discrete-time economy is populated by a unit measure of households. A household has a
unit of members who share consumption and regard the household’s utility as the common
objective.11 The household divides the members into four groups: potential innovators (l),
producers of final goods (h), financial intermediaries (k), and idle members (1− l−h−k),
where the symbol in brackets denotes the fraction of each group in the household.
Each member is endowed with one unit of time per period which he can divide between
work and leisure, the latter of which is denoted by n. If a member works in either final
goods production or financial intermediation, the required time input is 1 and so n = 0.
An idle member’s time input is 0 and so n = 1. If a member is a potential innovator, his
working time consists of the time searching and if matched, the time input in production.
The time input required for search is 1− n0 and the time input required for producing Y
units of innovation goods is c(Y ), where n0 ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Accordingly, leisure is
n0 for a member who searches but has no match, and [n0 − c(Y )] if he has a match.
The utility of enjoying n units of leisure is θn.12 Thus, the household’s total utility of
leisure in a period is:
∞X
t=1
βt−1 {u(qt) + θ(1− ht − kt − lt) + θlt (1− σe)n0 + θlt (σe) [n0 − c(Yt)]}
Here qt is the quantity of final goods consumed by the household, Yt the quantity of
innovation goods produced by the household, and σe ∈ (0, 1) the probability that an
11The device of a household is used here to maintain tractability, as it enables us to smooth the matching
risk within a household (to be described below) and hence to obtain a degenerate distribution of money
holdings across households. See Shi (1997).
12We have also experimented with the more general specification Θ (n) with Θ0 (n) > 0 and Θ (0) = 0.
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innovator produces innovation goods (to be explained later). The discount factor is β ∈
(0, 1) and the discount rate is R ≡ β−1 − 1. The second term in the brackets is the utility
of leisure of the 1 − ht − kt − lt idle members. The third term is the utility of leisure of
the innovators who search but have no production opportunity and the last term is the
utility of leisure of those innovators who search and produce innovation goods. This precise
accounting of leisure time for each activity allows us to match the model to time-use data
as described later. Define the time input in search by potential innovators as ρ ≡ 1− n0.
The household’s preferences can be rewritten as follows:
∞X
t=1
βt−1 {u(qt) + θ(1− ht − kt)− θlt [ρ+ σec(Yt)]} . (1)
We pick an arbitrary household as the representative household and use lower-case
letters to denote its decisions. The decisions of other households and the aggregate variables
are denoted as capital-case letters. The representative household takes all capital-case
variables as given. In particular, the quantity Yt in the above utility function is chosen
by the household’s trading partners. For the remainder of the paper we suppress the time
index t and indicate the next period’s variable by the subscripts +1.
A household uses labor h to produce final goods according to the production function,
q(h, a), where a is the household’s productivity in the final goods sector. Productivity is
determined by innovation as follows. A household has the technology to produce one type
of innovation good, which has no use to the household but can be used by some other
households as an input into the innovation process. The time requirement for producing
Y units of innovation goods is c(Y ), as specified above. The household must use other
households’ innovation goods as the input in its innovation. If i is the amount of such
input in the current period, then the household’s productivity in the next period will be
a+1 = a [1 + f(i)] .
Let us refer to the function f(i) as the innovation function and to a as knowledge capital.
Final goods and innovation goods are both perishable between periods.
For simplicity, we assume that the utility function, u; the disutility function of pro-
ducing innovation goods, c; the production function of final goods, q; and the innovation
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function, f ; have the following standard forms:
u(q) = ln(q), c (Y ) = c0Y α, q(h, a) = ahη, f(i) = f0iχ,
α > 1, c0 > 0, η, χ ∈ (0, 1), f0 > 0.
(2)
The market for final goods is centralized and Walrasian. A producer can sell final goods
without transactions cost, and money is not needed for such transactions. This formulation
helps us in focusing instead on the need for liquidity in the market for innovation goods.13
We will directly invoke the result that a household’s consumption of final goods is equal
to the quantity produced in a symmetric equilibrium. That is, q = q(h, a).
The market for innovation goods, referred to as the innovation market, is decentralized.
Individuals in the innovation market are randomly matched in pairs. In any given match,
the first agent can make use of the innovation good produced by the second agent with
probability σ ∈ (0, 1); with the same probability, the second agent can make use of the
innovation good produced by the first agent. No double-coincidence occurs. Let us label
the agent who can use the other agent’s innovation good as the buyer, and the other agent
as the seller. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller which consists of an
amount of money to be paid by the buyer and a quantity y of the innovation good to be
produced by the seller.
To capture the demand for and supply of liquidity in the innovation market, we make
two additional assumptions on this market. First, at any given time, many people can
have good ideas but they may not have enough liquid funds to finance the development
of their ideas. More precisely, we assume that agents are anonymous and no form of
record-keeping is feasible in the innovation market. For transactions to take place in this
market, a medium of exchange is needed. This medium is fiat money, a perfectly storable
object which is intrinsically worthless. Second, good ideas and the ability to use good ideas
do not always arise easily, and so there is heterogeneity in the need for liquidity. More
precisely, we assume that only a fraction e of a household’s potential innovators can enter
the innovation market in any given period and that a potential innovator realizes whether
he can enter the market after he is given money.14 As a result, those who cannot enter the
13In an early version, we explored the alternative assumption that the market for final goods is charac-
terized as random, bilateral matches. In that formulation, inflation generates a welfare effect similar to
that in the current formulation, but much smaller growth effect than in the current formulation.
14Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Berentsen et al (2008) have used similar assumptions to model the
liquidity demand and supply in the market for final goods.
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innovation market have "idle" money which they would like to lend to earn interest, and
those who can enter the market demand more liquidity and are willing to pay for it.
Borrowing and lending is done through financial intermediaries that have free entry into
the financial sector. We assume that financial intermediaries have no ability to keep records
on transactions in the innovation market. This assumption prevents banks from issuing
credit that supersedes money or directly intermediating the trade in the innovation market.
However, banks are able to keep financial records on monetary loans and repayments, at
a cost. So, borrowing/lending is in terms of money. If a buyer fails to repay a loan, the
bank can confiscate money holdings of the buyer’s household, which ensures that loans
are always repaid. Banks take the deposit rate as given and compete in the loan market.
Depositors have perfect information about the banks’ financial state and trading histories,
which induces the banks to always repay the depositors.15
The production function in the financial sector is such that labor input required to
create and administer loans is proportional to the number of loans.16 Since only a fraction
e of the potential innovators can enter the innovation market, the number of loans is eL,
where L is the aggregate measure of innovators per household. The aggregate measure
of workers in the financial sector per household is K. Thus, the technology of financial
intermediation requires:
eL = φK, (3)
where φ > 0 is a constant measuring financial productivity. We refer to the case φ → ∞
as a perfect loan market; i.e., one in which financial intermediation requires no resources.
Financial intermediaries take the loan rate, rc, the deposit rate, rd, and the nominal
wage rate, w, as given. There is no strategic interaction among financial intermediaries
or between financial intermediaries and agents. In particular, there is no bargaining over
the terms of the loan contract. Instead, these terms will be determined by free entry of
intermediaries, which drives each financial intermediary’s profit to zero.
For clarity, let us describe the sequence of events in a period as follows. First, at
the beginning of the period, each household chooses the allocation of the members into
15Our assumptions of perfect monitoring by the banks on the borrowers and by the depositors on the
banks simplify the analysis and enable us to focus on growth. For a relaxation of this assumption, see
Berentsen et al (2007).
16We can generalize this specification by adding a component of the labor requirement for financial
intermediation that is proportional to the real stock of loans. However, the part of the cost that is
independent of the size of the loan is important for the results.
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the four groups, and divides its holdings of money among the innovators. Second, the
innovators leave the household. Each innovator learns whether he can enter the innovation
market and decides whether to borrow from or lend to financial intermediaries. Third,
after borrowing and lending, innovators are matched randomly and bilaterally, and they
trade. Simultaneously, in the final-goods market, the producers produce and sell the final
goods, and also purchase final goods for the household’s consumption. Fourth, the members
bring money and purchased goods back to the household. The household consumes the
final goods and uses the innovation goods purchased from other households as the input
in the innovation process to increase future productivity. Before the period ends, the
household repays the loans, receives interest payments on its deposits, and receives a lump-
sum monetary transfer from the government.
Like many models of endogenous growth (e.g., Lucas, 1988), our model generates long-
run growth through the non-diminishing marginal productivity of a in the innovation
process. In particular, the law of motion and the production function q(h, a) are both
linear in a. The allocation of time between different sectors is an important dimension
along which inflation affects economic activities in our model. The new feature of the
model is decentralized exchange in the innovation market. This feature generates the de-
mand for liquidity and the need for financial intermediation. It is an important channel
through which inflation affects resource allocation and growth.
2.1 The social planner’s allocation
To provide a benchmark against which to measure the efficiency of the equilibrium, let us
first consider the allocation of a social planner. Assume that the social planner can dictate
all quantities, but is subject to the same matching frictions in the innovation process as
the market is. The social planner does not need a credit market, and so k = 0. Denote
the planner’s allocation as S = {l, h, q, y}, where l the fraction of potential innovators;
h the fraction of agents who produce final goods; (1− l − h) the fraction of agents who
enjoy leisure; q the quantity of final goods produced and consumed by a household; and y
the amount of innovation goods produced in each bilateral match. Denote the maximized
social welfare function as W (a). Then, the planner’s allocation solves:
W (a) = max
S
{u [q (h, a)] + θ(1− h)− θl [ρ+ σec(y)] + βW (a+1)}
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subject to the following constraints:
a+1 = a[1 + f(i)] (4)
i = σely. (5)
The first term in the welfare function is a household’s total utility from consumption
and leisure, where we have substituted the result that the quantity of final goods consumed
is equal to the quantity produced. The difference between the second term and the third
term is the total utility of leisure in the household, where el is the fraction of agents who are
innovators and σ is the probability that each innovator has a match in which the innovator
produces. The law of motion of productivity is given by (4). The amount of input in the
innovation process is given by (5), because σel is the fraction of agents who purchased
innovation goods from other households and each purchased an amount y.
Denote the solution to the above problem by adding the superscript s to the variables.
Define a balanced growth path of the social optimum as such that the growth rate of a
is constant while the levels of (h, l, y) are constant. With the functional forms in (2), we
can establish the following proposition (the proof of which is straightforward and, hence,
omitted):
Proposition 1 There exists a unique balanced growth path of the social optimum, which
is the solution to (5), and the following equations:
η/hs = θ (6)
ρ = (α− 1)σec(ys) (7)
R [1 + f (is)] =
f 0 (is)
θc0(ys)
(8)
The socially efficient rate of growth is:
gs = 1 + f (is) . (9)
Equations (6) and (7) come from the first-order conditions of h and l, respectively;
they say that the marginal cost of allocating an agent to produce the final good or the
innovation good must be equal to the marginal utility of leisure. Equation (8) results from
combining the envelope condition of a along the balanced growth path and the first-order
condition of y.
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3 Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
3.1 The representative household’s decisions
At the beginning of a period, the household chooses the division of its members into
potential innovators, l; producers of final goods, h; financial intermediaries, k; and members
who enjoy leisure, 1− l−k−h. It allocates money evenly among the potential innovators,
each getting m/l units of money. The household also chooses the quantity of final goods
to be produced and purchased, q, and the offer that a buyer in the innovation market will
make in a match. The offer consists of the amount of money to be given to the seller
in the match, x, and the quantity of the innovation good to be asked from the seller, y.
After leaving the household, potential innovators face the probability e of being able to
enter the innovation market. Those who can enter may borrow money from the financial
intermediary, and let bc be the nominal amount of borrowing. Those who cannot enter the
market may lend money to the financial intermediary, and let bd be the nominal amount of
lending. Moreover, the household chooses future holdings of money, m+1, and the future
productivity, a+1. The decision variables of the household are then:
z ≡ [q, l, k, h, x, y, bc, bd,m+1, a+1] .
Let m denote a representative household’s holdings of money at the beginning of a
period. The household’s value function is V (a,m). Define:
ω ≡ β∂V (a+1,m+1)
∂m+1
and λ ≡ β∂V (a+1,m+1)
∂a+1
.
The variable ω is the shadow value of money next period and λ the shadow value of future
productivity, both of which are discounted to the current period.
The representative household’s problem is to choose z to solve the following problem:
V (a,m) = max
z
{u [q (h, a)] + θ(1− k − h)− θl [ρ+ σec(Y )] + βV (a+1,m+1)}
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subject to the following constraints:
bd ≤
m
l
, (10)
x ≤ m
l
+ bc, (11)
Ωx ≥ θc (y) , (12)
a+1 = a+ af(i), (13)
m+1 −m = σel (X − x) + l [(1− e) bdrd − ebcrc] + wk + T. (14)
where i = σely. In the objective function, the first term is the utility of consuming final
goods, where we have again used the result that q = q(h, a). The difference between the
second and the third terms in the objective function is the utility of leisure. As explained
before, the household takes as given the quantity of production of the innovation goods,
Y , because it is determined by other households’ buyers who make a take-or-leave-it offer.
According to (10), a depositor cannot deposit more money than the amount he is given
by the household. The next two conditions, (11) and (12), are the constraints on the offer
that will be made by a buyer of the household in the innovation market. The constraint
(11) specifies that such a buyer cannot offer more money than his money balance, which
consists of the amount given by the household, m/l, and the amount borrowed, bc. The
constraint (12) says that the offer must induce the seller to trade; that is, the value of the
money received by the seller, Ωx, must be at least as high as the disutility of producing
the proposed quantity y.17
The law of motion of productivity is (13), where the inputs are the amount of innovation
goods that the household’s buyers obtain from trade, i = σely. The law of motion of the
household’s money balance is (14). The term σel (X − x) is net money receipts from
trading in the innovation goods market, since a fraction σe of potential innovators spend
an amount x to buy innovation goods and a fraction σe of them receive an amount X
when selling innovation goods. The term l [ebdrd − (1− e) bcrc] is net money receipts from
borrowing and lending since a fraction e of potential innovators borrow money and a
fraction 1 − e of them deposit money, where rd is the deposit rate and rc the loan rate.
Finally, the household receives wage payments for workers in the financial sector, wk, and
17Note that it is the household that chooses the offer (x, y), taking into account all the constraints (i.e.,
(11) and (12)) that a buyer will face in a match. A buyer simply implements this offer. Thus, there is no
need to specify a separate bargaining problem for each buyer.
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lump-sum monetary transfers from the government, T .
We will examine an equilibrium in which the deposit rate is positive, i.e., rd > 0. In this
case, a lender will deposit all his money balance in the financial intermediary, and so (10)
holds as equality. Moreover, if the loan rate is positive, a borrower will never borrow more
than what he will need in a trade. As a result, a buyer in the innovation market will offer
his entire money balance in a trade; that is, (11) holds as equality. The other constraint
on the offer, (12), also holds as equality because it is not optimal for a buyer to leave a
positive surplus to the seller under the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it offers. Since (10)
through (12) all hold as equality, we can use them to solve for (x, bc, bd). Substituting the
solutions into the objective function and the other constraints, we can derive the following
optimal conditions of (y, k, h, l) and the envelope conditions of (a,m):
(i) The optimal choice of the amount of innovation goods to be asked in a match, y:
σλaf 0 (i) = (σ + rc) θc0 (y) (15)
This condition equates the marginal benefit of a unit of innovation good to the marginal
cost. When the household instructs an innovator to ask the seller to produce an additional
unit of innovation good, the household will obtain the additional unit with probability σ,
because only with probability σ does an innovator have a match in which he is the buyer.
The additional unit of innovation good increases the household’s productivity next period
by af 0(i), whose value is λaf 0(i) in terms of utility. Thus, the expected marginal benefit of
asking for a higher y is σλaf 0(i). In order to induce a seller to produce an additional unit of
innovation good, a buyer needs to offer θc0(y)/Ω units of money. Carrying this additional
amount of money has two costs. First, an innovator needs to borrow the additional amount
of money, regardless of whether the innovator will be matched. The unit cost of borrowing
is the loan rate rc. Second, once matched as a buyer (which occurs with probability σ), the
innovator needs to pay the additional amount of money to the seller. In terms of utility,
the marginal cost of increasing y is ωθ(σ + rc)c0(y)/Ω, which becomes the right-hand side
of (15) in a symmetric equilibrium where Ω = ω.
(ii) Optimal choices of the number of financial intermediaries, k, and final-goods pro-
ducers, h:
ωw =
η
h
= θ. (16)
The terms ωw is the value of wages (in terms of utility) earned by a financial intermediary,
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and the term η/h is the marginal value of consumption goods produced by an additional
producer. The above condition requires that the marginal benefit of increasing k or h
should be equal to the marginal utility of leisure, which is θ.
(iii) Optimal choice of the number of innovators, l:
λaf 0 (i)σey = θ [ρ+ (rc + σ) ec (y)] (17)
Allocating an additional member to be a potential innovator has the following benefits and
costs. First, he has probability e to be able to enter the innovation market. Second, once
in the market, he has probability σ to be a buyer, in which case he obtains an amount y of
innovation goods which will increase the household’s productivity next period by af 0 (i) y.
Thus, the expected benefit of an innovator in the market is given by the left-hand side of
(17). Third, with probability σ, the innovator in the market will be a seller in which case
he incurs the time c(Y ) to produce the innovation good. Note that the value of money
paid by a buyer cancels with the value of money obtained by a seller, because X = x in a
symmetric equilibrium. Since an innovator will become a borrower with probability e, the
expected cost of borrowing incurred by an innovator is eωrcx, which is equal to the second
term on the right-hand side of (17) after substituting x = θc(y)/Ω and Ω = ω.18 Finally,
an innovator foregoes the value of leisure, which is θρ.
(iv) The envelope conditions for a and m:
λ−1
β
= λ [1 + f (i)] +
1
a
(18)
ω−1
β
= ω + ω [(1− e) rd + erc] . (19)
These conditions state that the current value of an asset (a or m) is equal to the future
value of the asset plus the additional value of the asset in the current exchange. According
to (18), a marginal unit of productivity results in [1 + f (i)] units of future productivity, the
value of which is λ [1 + f (i)]. In addition, a marginal unit of productivity saves production
cost of final goods, whose value in terms of utility is u0(q)hη = 1/a. Similarly, in (19), an
additional unit of money (in the hands of an innovator) allows the innovator to earn the
deposit rate when the innovator cannot enter the innovation market, and to save the cost
of borrowing when the innovator can enter the innovation market.
18Increasing l also reduces the amount of money each innovator has. However, the negative effect of this
reduction cancels with the positive effect generated by the presence of more innovators.
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3.2 Symmetric Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
There is free entry of financial intermediaries. Let Bc be the economy-wide average of
the amount of borrowing per borrower and Bd the economy-wide average of the amount
of lending per lender. Since a household has a measure eL of borrowers and a measure
(1− e)L of depositors, the aggregate amount of loans and deposits per household is LeBc
and L (1− e)Bd, respectively. Since a financial intermediary hires a measure K of workers
and pays the nominal wage w, the nominal cost of financial intermediation is wK. The
intermediary covers this cost with a spread between the loan rate, rc, and the deposit rate,
rd. Therefore, the intermediary’s profit is
L [rceBc − rd (1− e)Bd]− wK.
With free entry of intermediaries, the above profit is zero, and so
rceBc − rd (1− e)Bd = wK/L. (20)
We focus on the monetary equilibrium which is symmetric in the sense that the decisions
are the same for all households. Also, as stated earlier, we focus on the equilibrium where
the deposit rate and the loan rate are both positive. Throughout this paper, monetary
policy is such that monetary transfer maintains the gross rate of money growth at a constant
level γ ≥ β.
With the above focus, a monetary equilibrium consists of the representative household’s
decisions, z; other household’s decisions, Z; and interest rates, rd > 0 and rc > 0, which
meet the following requirements: (i) z solves the representative household’s maximization
problem above; (ii) the decisions are symmetric across households: z = Z; and (iii) the
final-goods market clears and each financial intermediary makes zero profit.
We have already used the market clearing condition for final goods: q = q(h, a). Note
that, since the value of money in terms of utility is ω, the nominal price of final goods is:
p =
u0(q)
ω
=
1
ωq
. (21)
Also, the intermediation technology, (3), implies that K = eL/φ.
A balanced growth path is defined as an equilibrium in which productivity, a, grows
at a constant gross rate g, and interest rates are non-negative and finite constants (i.e.,
0 ≤ rd ≤ rc <∞). It is clear from (13) that
g = 1 + f (i) . (22)
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Lemma 1 The balanced growth path has the following properties: (i) l, k and h are con-
stants in (0, 1); (ii) q grows at rate g; (iii) the marginal value of money, ω, decreases at
rate γ; and (iv) the marginal value of productivity, λ, falls at rate g. Moreover, interest
rates, rd and rc, satisfy:
γ
β
− 1 = erc + (1− e) rd (23)
φρ (rc − rd) (1− e) = e (α− 1) (rc + σ) (24)
On the equilibrium balanced growth path, {h, y, l, k} are determined by:
θ =
η
h
(25)
1 = φ (1− e) c (y) (rc − rd) (26)
R [1 + f (i)] =
χf (i)
αθ (σ + rc) elc (y)
(27)
φk = el (28)
The proof of this Lemma (which is omitted here) involves straightforward manipulations
of the equilibrium conditions derived earlier. Equation (23) comes from (19), which is the
envelope condition of money holdings. Equation (24) comes from the first-order condition
for l, (17). Equation (25) comes from the first-order condition of h stated in (16). Equation
(26) comes from the zero-profit condition of intermediation, (20). Finally, (27) is derived
from the envelope condition of a, (18), and (28) replicates the production function of the
financial sector.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the model to quantify the welfare and growth effects of inflation
and an improvement in the productivity of financial intermediation.
4.1 Calibration
The functions u(q), c(y), q(h, a) and f(i) have the forms in (2).19 The parameters to be
identified are as follows: (i) preference parameters: (β, θ, ρ, c0, α); (ii) technology parame-
ters: (η, f0, χ, σ, φ, e); (iii) policy parameters: the money growth rate γ. To identify these
19Note that a slightly more general form of q (h, a) is q(h, a) = ah0hη, where h0 > 0. We set the scale
parameter h0 to 1 because it affects only the initial level of a which is irrelevant for what follows. In
particular, a change in h0 does not affect any of the ratios in the model, such as R&D expenditure over
GDP and priv.
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parameters, we calibrate the behavior of the equilibrium balanced growth path to the cor-
responding average statistics of low-inflation countries and, in particular, to the US-data.
The use of the balanced growth path in the calibration is reasonable, because low-inflation
countries are typically developed countries. Table 4 lists the identification restrictions and
the identified values of the parameters.
In the calibration, the inflation rate and per capita growth rate match the ones of
the average low-inflation country (see Table 2). For the return on R&D investments we
use a survey article by Nadiri (1993). In this article, Nadiri examined 63 studies and
concluded that R&D activity renders, on average, a 20 to 30 percent annual return on
private (industrial) investments. Since our R&D to GDP ratio also includes government
spending on R&D we set the annual return to 20 percent for the baseline calibration. We
also experiment with lower values in the robustness section.
Table 4: Calibration and parameter values
parameters values identification restrictions
β 0.8899 return on R&D investments = 0.2
γ 0.0875 nimlow = 0.03
σ 0.0274 inflation rate = 0.056
α 1.1313 nimmid = 0.035
η 0.64 labor share = 0.64
ρ 0.007 nimhigh = 0.059
c0 0.9 set to 0.9
e 0.7341 working time/total time = 0.2
φ 643.75 loan officers / employment = 0.0025
θ 3.3952 R&D employment/total employment = 0.055
χ 0.36 R&D expenditure to GDP ratio = 0.0262
f0 0.0407 per capita growth rate = 0.030
In the empirical literature, various measures of bank spreads are used as proxies for
the theoretical concept of the cost of financial intermediation (Brock and Rojas-Suarez,
2000). According to Brock and Rojas-Suarez, the most common empirical measure of
bank spreads in panel data analysis is the net interest margin (nim). It is calculated by
dividing the difference between interest income earned and interest income paid by total
assets. The model equivalent of the net interest margin is the interest rate wedge, rc − rd.
For the calibration we use the average net interest margin among low-inflation countries,
nimlow = 0.03; the average net interest margin among medium-inflation countries, nimmid
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= 0.035; and the average net interest margin among high-inflation countries as targets,
nimhigh = 0.059.20
As in King and Rebelo (1993), 20% of the total time is allocated to working which
consists of producing final goods, producing innovation goods, and working for financial
intermediaries. According to a report on occupational employment and wages by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2006), the fraction of loan officers to total employment in
May 2005 was 0.0025.21 According to the occupational employment statistics survey (OES:
Table 788), the individuals employed in science and engineering occupations is 5.5% of the
total workforce in May 2007. According to the report "Factbook 2008: Economic, Envi-
ronmental and Social Statistics" published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the average of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP for
1981-2006 for the US is 2.62%. Finally, a labor share of 0.64 is standard.
Table 5: Calibration
Inflation Growth Size of FS
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Low 0.056 0.056 0.030 0.0300 1.00 1.00
Mid 0.093 0.093 0.019 0.0285 0.57 0.86
High 0.306 0.306 0.014 0.0230 0.37 0.46
Table 5 compares the model’s predictions on inflation, the growth rate, the size of the
financial sector (FS) and the interest margin with the data. For low-inflation countries,
these variables have the same values in the model as in the data because they are used
as the targets in the calibration. We also set inflation rates of mid- and high-inflation
countries to match the data. In addition, we use data on interest margins for the three
groups of countries. When inflation increases from low to high levels, the growth rate falls
in the model as well as in the data, although in the data it falls more sharply. Similarly,
the size of the financial sector falls in the model, but not as sharply as in the data.
4.2 Welfare analysis
We now quantify the cost of inflation and the benefit of an exogenous improvement in
financial productivity. Denote the net rate of inflation as π. We focus on the balanced
20To calculate the net interest wedge we use the data in Beck et al (2001).
21According to this report, in May 2005, 332690 people were working as loan officers and total employ-
ment in the economy was 130307850. The implied ratio 0.0025 is similar to the number 0.0028 used by
Dotsey and Ireland (1996).
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growth path.
Following the literature (e.g. Lucas, 2000, and Lagos andWright, 2005), we measure the
welfare cost of inflation at π relative to π0 by asking how much consumption (in percentage)
agents would be willing to give up in order to change inflation from π to π0. Similarly, we
measure the welfare benefit of an exogenous improvement in financial productivity from
φ to φ0 by asking how much consumption (in percentage) agents would be willing to give
up for the improvement. To express these measures formally, let π be any given inflation
rate, φ any level of financial productivity, and ∆ any fraction. Slightly abusing an earlier
notation, we write the household’s expected discounted utility under (π,∆, φ) as:
V (π,∆, φ) =
∞X
t=1
βt−1 {ln (q∆) + θ(1− k − h)− θl [ρ+ σec(y)]}
where the quantities (y, q, l, k, h) take their values on the equilibrium balanced growth path
where ∆ = 1. Note that q is not stationary on the balanced growth path; rather, it grows
at the gross rate g. Expressing qt = q1gt−1, we can rewrite the expected utility as
V (π,∆, φ) =
1
1− β
∙
ln (∆q1) +
β
1− β ln (g) + θ(1− k − h)− θl [ρ+ σec(y)]
¸
For any fixed φ, the welfare cost of inflation at π relative to π0 is the value of (1−∆) that
solves V (π0,∆, φ) = V (π, 1, φ). Similarly, for any fixed π, the welfare benefit of improving
the exogenous component of financial productivity from φ to φ0 is the value of (1−∆) that
solves V (π,∆, φ0) = V (π, 1, φ).
4.3 The growth and welfare effects of inflation
Consider the three groups of countries that differ in the inflation rate; i.e., the countries
with low inflation (5.6%), medium inflation (9.3%), and high inflation (30.6%). For each of
these groups, Table 6 reports the key variables on the balanced-growth path and compares
this equilibrium to the equilibrium with zero inflation. Also, Table 6 reports the gains in
welfare and the growth rate from moving to zero inflation.
As Table 6 shows, the quantity of innovation goods traded and the time spent in
innovation both decrease significantly after an increase in inflation. As a result, the growth
rate is decreasing in inflation, and this negative effect of inflation on growth is large. For
the average medium-inflation country, reducing its inflation from the average (9.3%) to
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zero increases the long-run growth rate by 0.447 percentage points. For the average high-
inflation country, reducing its average inflation to zero increases the long-run growth rate by
0.997 percentage points. These effects of inflation on growth fall into the range of empirical
estimates obtained from cross-country studies (see the references in the Introduction).
They are much larger than the growth effects of inflation found in the literature. In
Gomme (1993) and Dotsey and Ireland (1996), for example, reducing inflation to zero in
a similar experiment increases growth by only 0.05 percentage points, about one ninth of
the growth effect obtained in our model.
Table 6: Effects of inflation in baseline model
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01385 0.011 0.0097 0.00594
time in finance 0.00055 0.0005 0.00048 0.00038
time working 0.20289 0.2 0.19868 0.19482
net interest margin 0.02401 0.03005 0.03417 0.05962
bank credit (priv ratio) 1.30981 1 0.85927 0.45812
innovation goods 1.17952 1 0.91191 0.6241
R&D / GDP 0.03432 0.0262 0.02251 0.012
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.29413 0.44676 0.9967
welfare loss (% of c) 0 1.41772 2.20737 5.30675
Higher rates of inflation also affect the financial market considerably. Table 6 shows
that the size of the financial market relative to the economy decreases significantly with
inflation, as indicated by the large reduction in the ratio of loans to GDP (i.e., the priv
ratio). For the medium-inflation country, the ratio of loans to GDP is only 86% of the
ratio for the low-inflation country, and for the high-inflation country this ratio is 46% of
the ratio for the low-inflation country.
Inflation has large welfare effects. Even for the average low-inflation country, reducing
inflation from the historical mean (5.6%) to zero increases consumption by 1.42%. For the
medium-inflation country, the welfare gain from reducing inflation from the historical mean
(9.3%) to zero is 2.21% of consumption. For the high-inflation country, the corresponding
welfare gain is 5.31% of consumption. These welfare effects are considerably larger than
the ones obtained in the literature (e.g., Dotsey and Ireland, 1996), partly because inflation
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has a larger negative effect on growth in our model than in the literature.
4.4 Decomposing the welfare and growth effects
In this subsection, we investigate how the distortions of inflation on various margins of
the labor input in innovation contribute to the large welfare and growth effects of inflation
reported in Table 6. We examine, in turn, the roles of the fraction of agents allocated to
the innovation sector, l, and the quantity of innovation goods traded in a match, y. In
both cases, we fix the variable under examination at the value calibrated under the low
rate of inflation, and then change inflation from one level to another. Because the baseline
model is calibrated to the statistics of the average low-inflation country, this experiment
does not require recalibration of the model.
Table 7: Effects of inflation when l is fixed
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01267 0.011 0.0102 0.0077
time in finance 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
time working 0.20167 0.2 0.1992 0.1967
net interest margin 0.02389 0.03005 0.03424 0.05999
bank credit (ratio) 1.20357 1 0.90193 0.59043
innovation goods 1.1837 1 0.91067 0.6216
R&D / GDP 0.03153 0.0262 0.02363 0.01547
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.19006 0.29054 0.66663
welfare loss (% of c) 0 0.98612 1.53299 3.71704
First, let us examine whether the choice of the number of potential innovators is im-
portant for the effects of inflation. For this purpose, we fix l at the baseline level and
compute the effects of inflation which are reported in Table 7. Note that fixing l fixes only
the extensive margin of the time input in innovation; the intensive margin is the amount of
time each seller in the innovation market puts into production, which is c(y) and can vary
with the choice of y. Under the fixed l, the fraction of total working time is less elastic
with respect to inflation than in the baseline model. Also, the reduction in the quantity of
innovation goods traded in a match is only slightly higher than the reduction displayed by
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the baseline model. However, both the growth effect and the welfare effect are significantly
smaller than those in the baseline case. From Tables 6 and 7, we infer that the endogenous
response to inflation by the extensive margin of the labor input in innovation contributes
to about 30% of the growth effect of inflation as well as the welfare effect of inflation.
Note that even with the fixed l, growth and welfare effects of inflation are still much larger
here than those reported in the literature.
Next, we fix the intensive margin of the labor input in innovation at the baseline level,
which is equivalent to fixing the quantity of innovation goods traded in a match, y. Again,
we compute the effects of inflation which are reported in Table 8. Under the fixed y, an
increase in inflation reduces the time in innovation and the time in financial intermediation
more significantly than in the baseline model. As a result, the negative effect of inflation on
the growth rate is about 12% larger than in the baseline model. However, the negative effect
of inflation on welfare is almost the same as that in the baseline model. The reason is that
as the total labor supply falls by more than in the baseline model, leisure increases by more
than in the baseline model, which mitigates the negative welfare effect of inflation caused
by the reduced growth rate. Thus, we infer that the endogenous response to inflation by the
intensive margin of the labor input in innovation contributes moderately to the negative
growth effect of inflation but only slightly to the welfare cost of inflation.
Table 8: Effects of inflation when y is fixed
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01467 0.011 0.00936 0.00481
time in finance 0.00067 0.0005 0.00043 0.00022
time working 0.20384 0.2 0.19829 0.19353
net interest margin 0.02405 0.03005 0.03415 0.05949
bank credit (ratio) 1.32218 1 0.85435 0.44386
innovation goods 1 1 1 1
R&D / GDP 0.03464 0.0262 0.02238 0.00116
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.33209 0.50328 1.11173
welfare loss (% of c) 0 1.40548 2.21397 5.48096
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4.5 Exogenous development in financial intermediary
In this subsection, we analyze how financial development affects growth and welfare. Levine
et al (2000) find that an increase in the exogenous component of financial intermediary
development increases growth significantly. We use the parameter φ in the intermediation
technology to capture such an exogenous component of financial development.
Table 9: Effects of financial productivity
π = 5.6% π = 30.6%
φ φ/2 φ φ/2
time innovating 0.011 0.01072 0.00594 0.0058
time in finance 0.0005 0.00099 0.00038 0.00076
time working 0.2 0.20021 0.19482 0.19506
net interest margin 0.03005 0.06111 0.05962 0.12094
bank credit (priv) 1 0.96822 0.45812 0.44316
innovation goods 1 0.9815 0.6241 0.61227
R&D / GDP 0.0262 0.02537 0.012 0.01161
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.03156 0 0.02473
welfare loss (% of c) 0 0.33141 0 0.28539
Table 9 displays the effects of decreasing φ to φ/2 for the average low-inflation country
and the average high-inflation country. First, for each country type, lower efficiency in the
financial sector increases the amount of working time in financial intermediation by roughly
100%. As the cost of financial intermediation increases, the loan-deposit spread increases
by roughly 100%, and bank credit decreases. Second, the time spent in innovation and
leisure both decrease. Third, the amount of innovation goods traded in a match decreases.
As a result of these changes, the net growth rate decreases. However, because the decrease
in the innovation time is very small, growth losses from the financial improvement are
one order of magnitude smaller than the growth losses from inflation reported in Table 6.
Welfare losses from this experiment are also much smaller than the ones reported in Table
6. Finally, note that at productivity φ/2 the average low-inflation country has about the
same interest-rate margin as the average high-inflation country with productivity φ. This
is another indication that financial development is much less important for welfare and
growth than inflation. On the basis of this result, we suggest that a monetary institution
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that keeps the inflation rate low should be the policy focus in development economics.22
5 Robustness
We perform several robustness checks. First, we introduce a role of money in the final-
goods market to show that the quantitative effects of inflation do not change much with
this additional role of money. Second, we eliminate from our data set all countries that
experienced hyperinflation between 1960-1995 and recalibrate the model. Third, we reduce
the return on R&D investment from 20% to 15% in the calibration. Fourth, we use the
relative priv ratios between different groups of countries instead of the relative net interest
rate margins in the calibration. For each robustness check we recalibrate the model and
perform the same counterfactual experiments as in the text.23
5.1 The model with cash-in-advance in the final-goods market
Let us assume that purchases of final (consumption) goods are subject to a cash-in-advance
constraint.24 As in the baseline model, we assume that the household needs to send only
one buyer and one seller to the consumption-goods market. In contrast to the baseline
model, the household must choose the division of money between the innovators going
to the innovation market and the buyer going to the final-goods market. Let mi denote
the total amount of money that the household allocates to the innovators. Then, the
cash-in-advance constraint in the final-goods market is:
m−mi > pq
With this additional constraint, the first-order condition for q is modified as
1
qωp
=
γ
β
22To simulate a less developed country such as Bolivia we would need to simultaneously reduce φ and
increase inflation, since this combination is what a less developed country has. However, the the effects
are only slightly larger than the one discussed in Table 6 where we only change the inflation rate since the
growth and welfare implication are mainly driven by the higher inflation.
23The parameter values resulting from the recalibration are available by request.
24Instead of using this shortcut to model the role of money in the final goods market, we have also
introduced matching frictions and decentralized trades to generate a demand for money. In such an
alternative model and with the assumption that the buyer in a match makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the
quantitative results are similar to the ones reported here.
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Using the market clearing condition for final goods, the first-order condition for h becomes
θ =
η
h
β
γ
None of the other first-order conditions is affected. However, the envelope condition for
a after some manipulations changes to
Rg =
(β/γ) fχ
θα (σ + rc) elc (y)
Table 10 presents the simulation results for the model with a cash-in-advance constraint
in the final-goods market.25 A comparison with Table 6 shows that time allocation is more
sensitive when money is required to buy final goods. The amount of innovation goods
traded in each match is also more sensitive. Therefore, adding a cash-in-advance constraint
in the final-goods market increases the negative growth effect of inflation. It also increases
the negative welfare effect of inflation, since inflation reduces households’ consumption not
only through its effect on the growth rate but also through the cash-in-advance constraint.
In terms of magnitude, however, the numbers reported in Table 10 are not substantially
different from those in Table 6. Relative to the baseline case, the negative growth effect of
inflation is 10% higher and the welfare cost of inflation is 15% higher.
Table 10: Effects of inflation with CIA in final-goods market
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01414 0.011 0.00957 0.00545
time in finance 0.00056 0.0005 0.00047 0.00035
time working 0.20563 0.2 0.19701 0.18488
net interest margin 0.02401 0.03005 0.03417 0.05961
bank credit (priv ratio) 1.32075 1 0.85463 0.44286
innovation goods 1.17966 1 0.91178 0.62344
R&D / GDP 0.0346 0.0262 0.02239 0.0116
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.3236 0.49215 1.10361
welfare loss (% of c) 0 1.63533 2.55427 6.26127
25In order to create the simulation results presented in Table 10, we recalibrate the model for the same
targets.
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5.2 Eliminating hyperinflation countries
In this section we eliminate all countries that have experienced hyperinflation or very high
inflation (episodes of inflation higher than 400% per year) within the sample period. The
eliminated countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel and Peru. We regroup
the resulting 57 countries in three groups of 19 countries whose average inflation rates
are: 5.4%, 8.8% and 16.9%, respectively. We then recalibrate the model and perform the
same simulation experiments as before. The simulation results are displayed in Table 11.
In this version, growth effects are substantially larger than in the baseline model. An
inflation equal to 30.6% yields a growth loss equal to 2.45 percentage points compared to
0% inflation, which is considerably higher than the loss presented in Table 6 (equal to 1
percentage point).
Table 11: Effects of inflation with different data sample
inflation
0% 5.4% 8.8% 16.9%
time innovating 0.01601 0.011 0.00899 0.00601
time in finance 0.00063 0.0005 0.00044 0.00034
time working 0.20514 0.2 0.19793 0.19485
net interest margin 0.02458 0.03081 0.03493 0.04536
bank credit (priv ratio) 1.50909 1 0.79701 0.5014
innovation goods 1.19638 1 0.90687 0.74398
R&D / GDP 0.03954 0.0262 0.02088 0.01314
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.83455 1.21262 1.84348
welfare loss (% of c) 0 4.69572 6.84782 10.4683
The key to understanding the larger growth effects of inflation is the relative size of
the financial sector (priv). For the average medium inflation country, the relative size in
the baseline calibration is 0.87 vs 0.79701 in Table 11.26 For the average high inflation
country, the relative size is 0.73 vs 0.5014.27 In order to match the interest-rate margin
targets (which are similar in the baseline model and here), the model response to inflation
has to be much more elastic which it achieves by making the size of the financial sector
26For the baseline calibration, the size of the financial sector is approximately 0.87 at 8.8% inflation.
27For the baseline calibration, the size of the financial sector at 16.9% inflation is approximately 0.73.
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responding more elastically to inflation.
5.3 Reducing the R&D return to 15%
In Table 12 we present simulation results when the model is recalibrated to match a R&D
return of 15%, instead of 20% used in the baseline model.
If we recalibrate the model to match a R&D return of 15%, the parameters change as
follows: β increases to 0.9307, σ increases to 0.0408, α increases to 1.1896, ρ increases to
0.0087, e decreases to 0.6162, φ decreases to 432.103, χ decreases to 0.16, and f0 decreases to
0.0159. Other parameters are not affected. Since we use the average low-inflation country
as the target in the calibration, such a country’s main equilibrium variables do not change
when the R&D return is lowered. For medium-inflation and high-inflation countries, the
household puts more time in each of the three market activities and produces a higher
amount of innovation goods than in the baseline model. The negative growth effect of
inflation is only a third, and the negative welfare effect of inflation is less than a half, of
that in the baseline model. However, these growth and welfare effects are still large relative
to the literature.
Table 12: Effects of inflation with smaller return on R&D
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01302 0.011 0.01005 0.00711
time in finance 0.00052 0.0005 0.00049 0.00046
time working 0.20204 0.2 0.19904 0.19607
net interest margin 0.02394 0.03005 0.0342 0.05963
change in bank credit (priv) 1.2351 1 0.88904 0.5483
innovation goods 1.1709 1 0.91624 0.64106
R&D / GDP 0.03236 0.0262 0.02329 0.01437
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.09282 0.14306 0.33956
welfare loss (% of c) 0 0.54959 0.8942 2.49574
Although it is difficult to identify the exact cause for the lower growth and welfare
effects of inflation, we think that the primary difference is the change in the size of β. The
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much higher β in the current case means that the household puts more time in innovation
activities and produces a higher amount of innovation goods than in the baseline model
for high inflation rates.
5.4 Change in bank credit as target
In the calibration of the baseline model, we used the differences between the net interest
rate margin in a (high-) medium-inflation country and a low-inflation country. Let us
now replace these targets with the differences in bank credit (priv) between a (high-)
medium-inflation country and a low-inflation country. This alternative calibration implies
lower efficiency in financial intermediation than in the baseline calibration. As a result, a
household has to spend more time in financial intermediation to obtain liquidity and less
time in innovation and production. The economy produces a lower amount of innovation
goods, and the ratio of R&D to GDP is lower. Not surprisingly, inflation has larger negative
effects on growth and welfare than in the baseline model. The magnitude of this difference
is noteworthy. For each of the three groups of countries, the growth effect of reducing
inflation to 0 is twice as large as in the baseline model; so is the welfare effect. In this
sense, the baseline calibration gives conservative estimates of the growth and welfare effects
of inflation.
Table 13: Effects of inflation with change in priv as target
inflation
0% 5.6% 9.3% 30.6%
time innovating 0.01549 0.011 0.0091 0.0043
time in finance 0.00061 0.0005 0.00045 0.00029
time working 0.2046 0.2 0.19805 0.19309
net interest margin 0.02371 0.03005 0.03445 0.06217
change in bank credit (priv) 1.46515 1 0.80486 0.32669
innovation goods 1.20385 1 0.90086 0.58683
R&D / GDP 0.03839 0.0262 0.02109 0.00856
growth loss (% pts) 0 0.65226 0.96657 1.94699
welfare loss (% of c) 0 3.58511 5.36344 11.0861
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we integrated a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of
endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation and financial development. A novel
feature of the model is that the market for innovation goods is decentralized, which requires
the use of money. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquid funds to
the innovation sector. After calibrating the model, we found that inflation has large effects
on both welfare and the long-run growth rate of per capita income. For example, reducing
inflation from 10% to zero increases the annual growth rate by one percentage point, and
the representative household in the economy is willing to give up five percent of permanent
consumption for eliminating such inflation. An exogenous improvement in the efficiency
of the financial sector also increases the growth rate and welfare, although such effects
are much smaller than those of reducing inflation. Moreover, a sizable fraction of the
welfare and growth effects of inflation comes from the endogenous response to inflation
by the extensive margin of labor input in innovation as opposed to the intensive margin.
Our results suggest that the need for liquidity and finance in the innovation sector is an
important and, perhaps, the most important reason why reducing inflation and increasing
the efficiency of the financial sector matter for long-run growth. It is time to shift research
from the traditional focus in macro-finance on consumption loans to the study of the
frictions that induce the need for liquidity and finance in the innovation market.
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Appendix
The calibration procedure
Using the targets listed in Table 4, the following procedure identifies the model’s para-
meters:
1) We set the model’s net real growth rate, g− 1, to be equal to the average per capita
real growth rate among low-inflation countries. This yields g∗.
2) We calibrate the growth rate of the money supply as γ∗ = (1 + μ)g∗, where μ is the
average net inflation rate among low-inflation countries.28
3) We set the deposit rate equal to r∗d = 0.2.
4) The average net interest rate margin among low-inflation countries, nim = 0.03, is
then used to calculate the loan rate r∗c = r
∗
d + nim.
5) From (23), we use r∗d, r
∗
c , and γ
∗ to get β∗ as a function of e:
β∗ (e) =
γ∗
er∗c + (1− e) r∗d
The real interest rate is then R∗ (e) = (1− β∗ (e)) /β∗ (e).
6) We then determine the allocation of time between goods production, innovation and
working in the financial sector by using three targets: the fraction of total working time in
total available time, 20%, the fraction of scientists and engineers in total employment, 5.5%;
and the fraction of people working as loan officers in total employment, 0.0025. Working
time in the financial sector is k∗ = 0.0025 ∗ 0.2 = 0.0005. Working time of scientists and
engineers is s∗ = 0.055 ∗ 0.2 = 0.0011. Accordingly, the time worked in the goods sector is
h∗ = 0.2− k∗ − s∗.
7) We set the labor share equal to η∗ = 0.64.
8) From the first-order condition for h, (25), we get θ∗ = η∗/h∗.
9) We define ψ ≡ elc(y) and use the zero profit condition, (20), to write ψ as a function
of e:
ψ∗ (e) = k∗/ [(1− e) (r∗c − r∗d)]
10) The average of R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP for 1981-2006 for the
US is 2.62%. We set the ratio of nominal R&D expenditure to nominal GDP equal to its
28Our calibration implies a money growth rate of 7.6%. For comparison, the US growth rate of M0 was
7.2% between 1960-1995, and the growth rates of M1 and M2 were 5% and 7%, respectively.
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target to get σ∗ (e):
0.0262 =
σ
σ + (1− e) (r∗c − r∗d) + 1/ [ψ∗ (e) ∗ θ∗]
11) We then rewrite (27) as follows:
R∗g∗ =
χ(g∗ − 1)
α∗ (e) θ∗ [σ∗ (e) + r∗c ]ψ
∗ (e)
This equation yields χ∗ (e) as a function of e.
12) We then rewrite (24) as follows
l∗ρ∗ (e) = ψ∗ (e)∗ (α− 1) [r∗c + σ∗ (e)] . (29)
In the model, time worked by scientists and engineers is σel∗c(y∗) + ρl∗ = σψ + ρl∗. We
set this equal to s∗ to get:
σ∗ (e)ψ∗ (e) + ρl∗ = s∗
Use this equation to substitute ρl in (29) to get
s∗ − σ∗ (e)ψ∗ (e) = ψ∗ (e)∗ (α− 1) [r∗c + σ∗ (e)] .
This equation yields α∗ as a function e, denoted α∗(e).
13) We normalize the quantity of innovation goods to y∗ = 1. Then, from the definition
of ψ, we can identify l∗ (e, c0):
l∗ (e, c0) = ψ∗ (e) / [ec0] (30)
since y∗ = 1.
14) Given l∗ (e, c0), we can identify ρ∗ (e, c0) :
σ∗ (e)ψ∗ (e) + ρl∗ (e, c0) = s∗
15) From the production function of loans (28) we get productivity φ∗ (e, c0) as a func-
tion of e and c0:
φ∗ (e, c0) = el∗ (e, c0) /k∗
16) We write the growth equation (22) as follows
g∗ − 1 = f0 [σ∗ (e) el∗ (e, c0)]χ
∗(e) (31)
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This equation yields f∗0 (e, c0) as a function of e and c0.
17) The time spent in producing innovation goods is c∗ (y∗) = c0 (y∗)
α∗(e). With our
normalization we get c∗ (y∗) = c0.
Finally, we are left with the task to identify e and c0. For the baseline calibration, we use
nim (see Table 1). As a robustness check we also use the change in priv as explained below.
For both calibrations, we find that the value of c0 does not affect any of our simulation
results. In particular, the growth and welfare effects of inflation are independent of c0. For
this reason, we simply set it to a number slightly lower than 1 since for consistency reasons
we need that 1− ρ− c0 ≥ 0. In fact, for all results presented we set it to c0 = 0.9.
Baseline calibration For the baseline calibration, we use the net interest rate margin,
nim, to identify e as follows. We construct a grid for the parameter e. For each grid point,
all parameters of the model are now determined and, therefore, we can simulate the model
for different rates of inflation. We do this to calculate the model’s nim for two inflation
rates. Using the average inflation rate among medium-inflation countries we calculate
nimmid (e), and for the average inflation rate among high-inflation countries, we calculate
nimhigh (e) for each grid point. From Table 1, the average nim among medium-inflation
countries is 0.035, and among high-inflation countries it is 0.059. We then choose the value
of e that minimizes
[nimmid (e) /0.035− 1]2 + [nimhigh (e) /0.059− 1]2 .
Alternative calibration For the alternative calibration we use priv to identify e as
follows. In the model, priv satisfies
priv =
1− e
σ + (1− e) (rc − rd) + 1/ [elc (y) θ]
We construct a grid for the parameter e. For each grid point, all parameters of the model
are now determined and, therefore, we can simulate the model for different rates of inflation.
We do this to calculate the model’s priv for three inflation rates. Using the average inflation
rate among low-inflation countries, we calculate privlow (e), using the average inflation rate
among medium-inflation countries we calculate privmid (e), and for the average inflation
rate among high-inflation countries we calculate privhigh (e). For each grid point we then
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calculate the following ratios
privmidratio (e) =
privmid (e)
privlow (e)
and
privhighratio (e) =
privhigh (e)
privlow (e)
From Table 1, the average priv among low-inflation countries is 0.48, among medium-
inflation countries is 0.28, and among high-inflation countries is 0.18. Accordingly, privmidratio =
0.57 and privhighratio = 0.37.29 We then choose the e that minimizes
[privmidratio (e) /privmidratio− 1]2 + [privhighratio (e) /privhighratio− 1]2 .
29We use the measure of the size of the financial sector, priv, from Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).
The measure priv contains all claims on the private sector of banks that take deposits divided by GDP.
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Country allocation
The data displayed in Table 1 contains 63 countries sorted into inflation tertiles. The
data on inflation, growth, bank credit and liquid liabilities are based on the data set used
by Levine et al (2000) which covers the period 1960-1995. The data on the net interest
margin is from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and covers the period 1980-1995.
The basket of low-inflation countries contains the following 21 countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Honduras, Japan, Malaysia,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan
China, Thailand, United States. The basket of medium inflation countries contains the
following 21 countries: Barbados, El Salvador, Finland, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, India,
Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Zimbabwe. The basket
of high-inflation countries contains the following 21 countries: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Greece,
Israel, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Uruguay,
Venezuela. Tables A1, A2 and A3 display annual inflation, net growth rate, bank credit,
liquid liabilities and net interest margin for each country contained in the basket of low-
inflation countries, the basket of medium-inflation countries and the basket of high-inflation
countries, respectively.30
30As in Table 1, "bank credit" is defined as claims on the private sector by deposit money banks, as a
share of GDP; "liquid liabilities" is defined as currency plus demand and the interest-bearing liabilities of
banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, as a share of GDP; "net interest margin" is defined as interest
income earned minus interest income paid, divided by total assets.
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Table A1: Low-inflation countries
annual
inflation
(%)
net growth rate of
real pc income
(%)
bank
credit
liquid
liabilities
net interest
margin
Australia 7.33 1.9751 34.01 51.73 0.0192
Austria 4.56 2.8892 62.30 67.50 0.0186
Belgium 5.28 2.6513 25.39 49.02 0.0233
Canada 5.95 2.3860 35.51 56.50 0.0175
Cyprus 5.33 5.3842 49.54 74.49 0.0665
Denmark 7.13 2.1794 42.13 49.48 0.0489
France 6.92 2.4313 55.36 63.37 0.0351
Germany 3.63 2.4537 71.00 57.46 0.0246
Honduras 7.12 0.5978 16.87 23.04 0.0693
Japan 5.38 4.3048 88.63 125.94 0.0175
Malaysia 3.89 4.1145 35.55 63.74 0.0247
Malta 3.98 6.6528 37.74 143.43 0.0234
Netherlands 4.81 2.2006 52.35 71.41 0.0146
Norway 6.93 3.1825 40.76 54.04 0.0313
Panama 3.79 2.0272 39.13 33.37 0.0204
P. N. Guinea 6.58 1.1204 20.84 31.05 0.0420
Sweden 7.18 1.8881 42.28 53.49 0.0266
Switzerland 3.95 1.4219 119.13 123.41 0.0155
Taiwan China 5.97 6.6247 53.72 66.97 0.0234
Thailand 5.87 4.8767 36.59 47.79 0.0298
United States 5.51 1.7123 58.42 62.12 0.0388
37
Table A2: Medium-inflation countries
annual
inflation
(%)
net growth rate of
real pc income
(%)
bank
credit
liquid
liabilities
net interest
margin
Barbados 8.72 2.6529 34.92 51.59 0.0334
El Salvador 10.80 -0.6076 22.71 26.94 0.0394
Finland 7.69 2.7985 51.71 45.35 0.0160
Guatemala 9.08 0.9292 11.99 20.22 0.0539
Guyana 10.17 -0.2806 15.12 52.96 0.0441
Haiti 7.89 -0.6579 7.15 22.60 0.0193
India 7.79 1.9152 17.01 32.95 0.0297
Ireland 9.08 3.2545 28.14 54.74 0.0161
Italy 9.57 2.9330 58.13 77.48 0.0360
Kenya 10.16 1.9625 16.95 35.74 0.0728
Rep. of Korea 10.44 7.1569 40.09 41.02 0.0229
Mauritius 9.63 3.0242 24.24 46.87 0.0324
Nepal 8.57 0.7672 6.92 20.27 0.0374
New Zealand 9.23 1.1241 25.44 49.63 0.0251
Pakistan 8.27 2.6982 20.76 38.68 0.0291
South Africa 9.97 0.3920 49.22 51.44 0.0388
Spain 10.41 2.8803 58.37 70.31 0.0376
Sri Lanka 8.55 2.7046 14.60 30.34 0.0509
T. & Tobago 9.55 1.1208 21.56 37.46 0.0368
United Kingdom 8.39 1.9622 45.55 48.63 0.0201
Zimbabwe 10.52 0.8382 12.97 46.92 0.0444
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Table A3: High-inflation countries
annual
inflation
(%)
net growth rate of
real pc income
(%)
bank
credit
liquid
liabilities
net interest
margin
Argentina 90.78 0.6176 14.26 18.34 0.0824
Bangladesh 11.57 0.7083 13.69 24.69 0.0071
Bolivia 50.85 0.3551 10.80 16.39 0.0347
Brazil 77.2 2.9301 16.12 19.16 0.1204
Chile 45.47 1.4470 25.44 22.96 0.0453
Colombia 18.24 2.2270 12.51 22.41 0.0637
Costa Rica 13.80 1.6137 18.11 29.38 0.0515
Dominican Rep. 12.11 2.4988 12.09 20.58 0.0633
Ecuador 17.80 2.3881 13.49 20.05 0.0717
Ghana 31.81 -0.9632 5.07 17.58 0.0709
Greece 12.65 3.2241 20.78 53.34 0.0352
Israel 39.53 2.8110 37.41 51.95 0.0330
Jamaica 14.78 0.4178 20.89 36.85 0.0913
Mexico 24.76 1.9739 9.92 25.57 0.0535
Paraguay 12.67 2.3819 10.19 17.62 0.0651
Peru 59.96 0.0602 8.71 18.52 0.0716
Philippines 11.76 1.1587 20.64 27.50 0.0420
Portugal 13.72 3.6473 60.66 78.02 0.0346
Sierra Leone 24.72 -0.3398 5.07 16.83 0.0741
Uruguay 46.12 1.0253 21.20 29.47 0.0556
Venezuela 11.93 -0.8836 19.26 36.84 0.0781
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